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W
e sometimes think of compensation for
employment as being a pretty straightforward
thing — you get paid a fixed rate for the
amount of time you work. But many jobs involve choices
that the worker makes on a daily basis — choices that
affect the outcomes achieved but are hard for the worker’s
boss to directly observe or influence. 
For instance, it becomes difficult to simply say “you do 
X and I’ll pay you Y” when X involves managing a portfolio
of assets. How do you know if the assets
have been effectively managed? Of
course, you can look at the results
achieved — for instance, the returns on
investments — and compensate the
manager based on those returns. But 
the results are likely to depend 
both on choices made by the portfolio
manager and on random factors beyond
the manager’s control. 
In general, you would like to be able
to base compensation on an indicator of
whether the manager made sound 
choices, but such indicators are hard 
to come by. After-the-fact indicators, 
like the actual portfolio performance,
although imperfect, may often be the
best you can hope for. By rewarding performance after 
the fact, a compensation arrangement faces the trade-off
between giving the manager an incentive to make good 
decisions and exposing the manager to risks beyond 
his control — risks that make the job less desirable to 
begin with.
The trade-off between risks and incentives is the 
fundamental problem in designing compensation schemes
in large organizations. The problem certainly arises in 
banks and other financial institutions, where pay policies
have been argued to have increased incentives for taking
large risks that contributed to the financial crisis. 
And in the wake of the crisis, efforts have begun, both 
in the United States and internationally, to increase the 
regulatory scrutiny of compensation practices in large
banks. But what exactly is the problem that regulation needs
to fix? 
Designing compensation schemes is complicated,
because of the difficulties in measuring performance and
tying it to the actions of employees. But typically, a firm 
that seeks to operate in the best interest of its shareholders 
has an incentive to create the best compensation 
scheme it can with the tools it has. What might get in the
way of a firm’s ability to strike the best possible balance
between risk and incentives?
While the common narrative that many firms’ pay 
practices gave executives an incentive to take excessive 
risks may have been true, it might not have been because 
compensation schemes were poorly aligned with 
shareholder interests. That is, it could
have been the case that shareholders
themselves had an inefficiently high
appetite for risk-taking by large 
financial firms and that executive 
compensation was well-aligned with
shareholders’ distorted interests. 
For financial firms, that distortion
comes from the safety net provided 
by deposit insurance as well as the
implicit subsidy that comes from some
firms being viewed as too big to fail.
These protections make creditors less 
concerned about the risks taken by a
firm, resulting in lower costs of debt
financing. And since shareholders 
benefit from higher returns, the safety
net will tend to increase a leveraged financial firm’s interest
in taking risks. So absent regulatory or supervisory interven-
tion, one might expect such firms to arrange their
executives’ compensation in ways that encourage, or at least
do not discourage, risky decisions.
In the presence of a safety net that distorts financial
institutions’ incentives for risk, regulation needs to replace
the discipline that would otherwise come from market
forces. Whether that regulation is most effective when
applied to compensation practices or more directly to the
risk-taking activities of a firm is somewhat of an open ques-
tion. But the effectiveness of either approach will be
enhanced by a recognition that the fundamental source of
incentive problems is not in compensation practices per se
but in the protections of the financial safety net.               RF
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